THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23

to consent to a religious divorce, the parties have, mistakenly, agreed upon a subjectmatter which does not lend itself to a legal transaction; they have, therefore, entered
56
into a contract legally impossible of performance ....
Implicit in the New York court's decision is the idea that mere appearance
before the rabbinical court involves only the recognition of a commitment voluntarily made to perform a ministerial act. On the other hand, if the reasoning of the German court is accepted, enforcement of the granting of a religious
divorce is not within the power of a state or its courts; the giving of the re'5 7
ligious divorce is "religious observance."
If the cases are to be reconciled, a distinction must be made between requiring only an appearance before a meeting of a religious tribunal-the New
York court talked in these terms-and the actual granting of a religious divorce-the problem the German court considered. It is difficult to maintain
this distinction; in both cases the act involved is the result of a religious rule
or law, and as such both may be considered religious acts. On the other hand,
the act in each case demands no prayer, blessing, or belief of special religious
significance; from this point of view the acts are mechanical. If "absolute"
freedom of religion is regarded as a goal which cannot be sacrificed in favor of
reasonable contractual expectations, the German court's position cannot be assailed. If, on the other hand, protection of contractual rights here is deemed
consistent with a proper degree of religious freedom, the New York court's
position is acceptable. The choice between the competing alternatives would
appear to be a policy decision.
Translation from Rheinstein, Comparative Law of Contracts 6-7 (1944).
' See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952).

'

THE PRE-THORLEY V. KERRY CASE LAW OF THE
LIBEL-SLANDER DISTINCTION
There is no question that the distinction between libel and slander was
firmly imbedded in our law in 1812 by Sir James Mansfield's decision in
Thorley v. Kerry.' Since then the distinction has become one of the best
known and most consistently criticized technicalities in the law. Only occasionally has any effort been made to rationalize it,2 and the few arguments
'4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P., 1812); also reported in 3 Camp. 214, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1358.
'E.g., Cardozo, "The schism in the law of defamation between the older wrong of slander
and the newer one of libel is not the product of mere accident.... It has its genesis in evils
What gives the sting to the writing is its permanence of
which the years have not erased ....
form. The spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and 'perpetuates the scandal.'
Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 39, 175 N.E. 505, 506 (1931).
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which have been mustered in its defense have all been effectively discredited. 3
One would expect Mansfield's decision to give at least some explanation of the
rationale for the distinction, but the opinion contains only the most derisive
criticism:
[WIhether it [a libel] tends to produce a breach of the peace ...is wholly irrelevant, and is no ground for recovering damages. So it has been argued that writing
shews more deliberate malignity; but the same answer suffices, that the action is not
maintainable upon the ground of the malignity, but for the damage sustained. So, it
is argued that written scandal is more generally diffused than words spoken, and is
therefore actionable; but an assertion made in a public place, as upon the Royal
Exchange, concerning a merchant in London, may be much more extensively diffused
than a few printed papers dispersed, or a private letter .... These are the arguments

which prevail on my mind to repudiate the distinction between written and spoken
scandal; but that4 distinction has been established by some of the greatest names
known to the law.

By carefully cataloguing all the reasons why the distinction between written
and spoken defamation was meaningless, Mansfield, consciously or not, precluded any further judicial questioning of its existence. This in itself is odd;
judges do not generally honor a doctrine which they dislike by an opinion
which by its form prohibits future judges from making any modifications.
But this is not the only curious aspect of the Thorley case. Though Mansfield said that he thought precedent compelled the decision which he made 5 and he must sincerely have believed it since he took such pains to show his
dislike of the distinction-still defense counsel must have thought that he had
some sort of doubt in his favor else he would not have based his defense on
the ground that "there was [no] solid ground, either in authority or principle,
for the distinction supposed to have prevailed in some cases, that certain words
are actionable when written which are not actionable when spoken." 6 That
defense counsel was an able lawyer is shown clearly by his argument, and this
' Dean Prosser summarized the effect of the distinction: "[I]t is actionable to write that
the plaintiff is a damned liar on a post-card, which is read by a single third person, but it
may not be actionable to say the same thing in a speech to an audience of a thousand people;
and [itis this distinction] by which, in many states, there may be recovery for a line in a
newspaper to the effect that a woman wears a funny hat, or an oral assertion that she is a

poor stenographer, but not for an oral accusation that she has given birth to a bastard child."
Prosser, Torts, § 92 (1941). Compare this with Mansfield's criticism in the Thorley case
quoted in text at footnote 4.
4 Taunt. 355, 365, 128 Eng. Rep. 367, 371 (C.P., 1812).

'He said, "I do not now recapitulate the cases, but we cannot, in opposition to them, venture to lay down at this day, that no action can be maintained for any words written, for
which an action could not be maintained if they were spoken." 4 Taunt. 355, 366, 128 Eng.
Rep. 367, 371 (C.P., 1812). This statement is also rather odd because judges do not usually
yield unwillingly to precedent without a careful consideration of the prior cases.
aIbid., at 358, 368.
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fact alone would seem to cast doubt on Mansfield's conclusion that he was
absolutely bound by precedent to honor the distinction.
Perhaps because it has always seemed so illogical, the origins of the distinction between libel and slander have captivated the interest of several legal
historians. There have been three excellent discussions, 7 but none of these has
approached the problem by an examination of the particular cases which constituted the precedent which Mansfield thought so forceful. It seems, therefore, worthwhile to follow the rather capricious development of the libelslander distinction in the pre-Thorley era, hoping by this method to show how
the distinction became so fixed by 1812 that even a most sympathetic judge
could not overturn it.
Before the sixteenth century, jurisdiction over libel and slander was in the
manorial and the ecclesiastical courts. In the court of the manor, monetary
redress was given for defamation, besides clearing the reputation of the accused "before the very persons in whose presence [he] had been reviled." 8 The
treatment of defamation in the ecclesiastical courts, on the other hand, was
less satisfactory from a pecuniary point of view. "The usual ecclesiastical
penance for the offense was an acknowledgement of the baselessness of the
imputation, in the vestry room in the presence of the clergyman and church
wardens of the parish, and an apology to the person defamed." 9
The king's courts at this early time apparently entertained no jurisdiction
over defamation cases.'-0 Not until the decay of the manorial courts, and the
Carr, The English Law of Defamation, 18 L.Q. Rev. 388 (1902); Veeder, History of the
Law of Defamation, 3 Select Essays in Anglo-American Legal History 446 (1909) ; 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 333 (1926).
' Veeder, op. cit. supra note 7 at 450. An illustration is found in the rolls of the Court of
the Abbot of Ramsey at King's Ripton, dating from 1288, where the following is recorded:
"Hugh Grayling complains of John Dike for that the said John slandered him by calling
him thief and was guilty of other enormities against him ...[and] against the peace and
to the damage of the said Hugh one halfmark .... The jurors say that John slandered the
said Hugh in such wise as Hugh alleges against him to his damage, etc. Therefore it is considered that the said John be in mercy for his trespass and that the said Hugh do recover
his damages, etc." Maitland, Select Pleas in Manorial and other Seignorial Courts, 2 Seldon
Society 109 (1889). For other examples, see ibid., at 36, 82, 95, 116, 143, 170. A later case,
in the Court of the Bishop of Ely at Littleport, which took place in 1322, found the court
measuring one slander against another, giving damages for the more seriously injured reputation: "It is found by inquest that Rohese Bindebere (3d.) called Ralph Bolay thief and
he (3d.) called her whore. Therefore both in mercy. And for that the trespass done to the
said Ralph exceeds the trespass done to the said Rohese, as has been found, therefore it is
considered that the said Ralph do recover from the said Rohese 12 d. for his taxed damages."
Maitland and Baildon, The Court Baron, 4 Seldon Society 133 (1891).
SVeeder, op. cit. supra note 7 at 451.
"oOn this point Maitland refers to the case of Vesay v. Fitz Thomas, "which fills a large
space on the Parliament Rolls of 1294 and 1295." Apparently the defendant had said several
unworthy things about the king, such as, "King Edward was the most cowardly knight of
his realm." Among the errors for which the proceeding was afterwards annulled was that
the case had begun with a charge of defamation, "and it is not used in this realm that pleas
of defamation should be pleaded in the king's court." Discussion abridged from Maitland,
Slander in the Middle Ages, 2 Green Bag 4 (1890).
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parallel growth of the king's courts, were actions on the case for defamation
brought within the royal jurisdiction 1 and the courts forced to distinguish the
royal from the ecclesiastical jurisdictions. Because the royal courts gave
money judgments, the distinction was made by making temporal damage a
prerequisite for action in the king's courts-a distinction still utilized in the
late seventeenth century. Thus in one case,'1 2 the slanderous words were: "She
had a bastard child." Denying that it had jurisdiction, the royal court said:
[S]he is not punishable at common law in the King's Temporal Courts for having
a bastard; nor is she punishable by [statute] unless her bastard be likely to become
chargeable to the parish.... In other cases she is only punishable in the Spiritual
Courts for whoring, and may sue there, but cannot sue here too; for the party would
13
be doubly punished by that means.
The early common law of defamation developed many other technical rules
limiting both the jurisdiction of the royal courts and the scope of the cause
of action. Firmly established by the sixteenth or seventeenth centuries, these
rules prohibited recovery unless the plaintiff could fit his case within one of
the rigid categories of actionable defamation. One such category-the most
general-is perhaps an extension of the distinction between the ecclesiastical
and the royal jurisdictions. The requirement of "temporal damage" for an action in a king's court apparently developed into the rule that only slanders
which resulted in provable special damages were actionable in the royal courts.
4
The deThis rule was accepted and applied in 1593 in Davies v. Gardiner.1
fendant had caused the plaintiff to lose her marriage by saying of her: "I
know Davis's [sic] daughter [plaintiff] well, she dwelt in Cheapside, and there
was a grocer that did get her with child." The court, in deciding for the plaintiff, said:
' Veeder, op. cit. supra note 7 at 457, refers this to the statute of 13 Edward 1, because,
"The time had passed when a new form of action could be created without [a] statute."
" Anonymous, 2 Salk. 694, 91 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B., 1697).
"Ibid., at 694, 588; also consult the immediately preceding case Byron v. Elmes, 2 Salk.
694, 91 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B., 1697). Of course the mere fact of no "temporal damage" suffered from defamatory statements did not automatically mean that the ecclesiastical court
would entertain the case and clear the shaded reputation. The allegation had to be one which
was cognizable as an action properly to be brought into the ecclesiastical court. This was
pointed out in Coxeter v. Parsons, 2 Salk. 692, 91 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B., 1699), also reported
in 1 Ld. Raym. 423, 91 Eng. Rep. 1181; 12 Mod. 231, 88 Eng. Rep. 1283. The words spoken
of a parson were: "he had no sense, was a dunce, and a blockhead; and he wondered the
bishop would lay his hands upon such a fellow, and that he deserved to have his gown pulled
over his ears." The slandered parson brought an action in the Spiritual Court to obtain satisfaction. The case was dismissed, "for a parson is not punishable in the Spiritual Court for
being a knave or a blockhead, more than another man." Regarding the possibility that the
parson might have lost his job, the court referred to the distinction above: "[I]f that be the

case he must bring his action at law; for that was a temporal damage."
" Popham 36, 79 Eng. Rep. 1155 (C.P., 1593). Also reported in 4 Co. Rep. 16 b, 76 Eng.
Rep. 897.
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[Tihe action lies here, for a woman not married cannot by intendment have so
great advancement as by her marriage... and therefore by this slander she is greatly
prejudiced in that which is to be her temporal advancement, for which it is reason
to give her remedy by nvay of action at common law [the defendant had claimed,
"this matter appeareth to be merely spiritual, and therefore... to be prosecuted in
the Spiritual Court"]: as if a woman keep a victualling-house, to which divers of
great credit repair, whereby she hath her livelihood, and one will say to her guests,
that as they respect their credits, they take care how they use such a house, for there
the woman is known to be a bawd, whereby the guests avoid her house, to the loss
of her husband, shall not she in this case have an action at common law for such a
slander? It is clear that she will.15
Where, however, the temporal loss had not occurred and was merely a strong
possibility, the ecclesiastical courts remained the proper forum for the action.16 "[N]o action lay at common law for what the common law took no
notice of, without special damages."' 7
Several categories were developed as exceptions to the rule requiring a
showing of special damages; the temporal loss in these cases was assumed
from the mere utterance of the slander, and, therefore, the royal jurisdiction
over these cases was assured. According to Holdsworth, the oldest of these
so-called "per se" categories:
[O]riginated in the days when the courts were trying to distinguish the defamatory
words which would be actionable in the common law courts, from those which were
actionable only in the ecclesiastical courts. The test hit upon was contained in the
question whether the offence charged was punishable in the common law courts...
and therefore an action for such defamation lay in those courts. If, on the other
8
hand.., the offence charged was "merely spiritual" .. . no action lay at common law.'
Another category of words actionable per e was comprised of those words
imputing a loathsome disease. In an action "for saying that [the plaintiff] had
caught the French Pox, and had carried them home to his wife," the plaintiff
had judgment, the court saying: "[T]he slander is not in the wicked means
of getting them, but in the odiousness of the infection, as a leper."' 9
Where the slander disgraced someone in his profession or trade an action
for defamation could also be brought without showing special damages. In
"Popham 36, 79 Eng. Rep. 1155. Coke does not report the quote.
" Bernard v. Beale, Popham 140, 79 Eng. Rep. 1241 (K.B., 1618).
'" Graves v. Blanchet, 2 Salk. 696, 91 Eng. Rep. 589 (K.B., 1704).
' 8 Holdsworth, History of English Law 348 (1926).
" Crittal v. Homer, Hobart 219, 80 Eng. Rep. 366 (K.B., 1619); Taylor v. Perkins, Cro.
Jac. 144, 79 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B., 1607) ("leprous knave" held actionable without proof of
special damages). However, where the disease alleged did not fit within the set of determined
loathsome diseases, no action would lie without proof of special damage. James v. Rutlech,
4 Co. Rep. 17 a, 76 Eng. Rep. 900 (K.B., 1599) ("pox," understood as "smallpox," not actionable per se).
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Jenkins v. Smith,

an attorney brought an action for these words: "Thou art

a false knave, a cozening knave, and hast gotten all that thou hast by cozenage; and thou hast cozened all those that have dealt with thee," and the
court held, "the action well lay; for they [the words] are very slanderous of
an attorney and touch him in his profession."
So also was it actionable per se, where misconduct was imputed in an office
of profit or an office of trust. Thus in Pridham v. Tucker,21 where a constable
had been accused of concealing a felony, the court allowed an action for
slander, saying: "though he is out of his office, yet he ought not to be slander'd
with any thing done in his office ...it defames him for ever, in the opinion of
others, and makes him accounted unworthy to bear an office for the future."
In the technical spirit of the day, however, a somewhat confusing rule was
carefully drawn to distinguish between allegations of misconduct in an office
22
of profit and in an office of trust. This difference was stated in How v. Prn.
The plaintiff was a justice of the peace and a deputy lieutenant, apparently
offices of honor and not profit. He had been accused of being "a Jacobite, and
for bringing in the Prince of Wales and Popery, to destroy the nation, &c."
In deciding for the plaintiff, the court discussed the relation between those
words actionable when spoken against one in an office of profit and those
actionable when spoken against one in an honorary office:
If a person be in a place of profit, and he is accused of insufficiency, he shall have
remedy by action: 'tis otherwise, if he be only in a place of honour; tho' even there,
if he is charged with ill principles, and as disaffected to the government, he shall have
an action for such scandal to his reputation. 23
The court preceded this discussion with an example of the application of this
distinction to one slandered in an office of trust:
It has been adjudged, that to call a justice of peace blockhead, ass, &c.is not a
slander for which action lies, because he was not accused of any corruption in his
employment, or any ill design or principle; and it was not his fault that he was a
blockhead, for he cannot be otherwise than his Maker made him: but if he had
been a wise man, and wicked principles were charged upon him, when he had not
them, an action would have lain; for tho' a man cannot be wiser, he may be honester
than he is.24
20Cro. Jac. 586, 79 Eng. Rep. 501 (K.B., 1621) ; cf. Squire v. Johns, Cro. Jac. 585, 79 Eng.
Rep. 500 (K.B., 1621) (calling a tradesman "bankrupt" held actionable).
' Pridham v. Tucker, Yelverton 153, 80 Eng. Rep. 103 (K.B., 1610) ; Wright v. Moorhouse, Cro. Eliz. 358, 78 Eng. Rep. 607 (C.P., 1594).
Holt, K.B. 652, 90 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B., 1702). Also reported in 2 Salk. 694, 91 Eng.
Rep. 588.
2Holt,
K.B. 653, 90 Eng. Rep. 1261.
Ibid. There were those who tried to liberalize the rules restricting relief in a slander
action. In Case of a Slander, Yelverton 150, 80 Eng. Rep. 101 (K.B., 1609), the words "Thou
does work by nigromancy [sic], and dost work by the devil" were held actionable, though
they would not fit within any of the actionable categories discussed above. The court seemed
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The most powerful technicality which the courts had to limit recovery in
defamation actions was the rule of taking the words alleged "in 'rnitioresensu.'
That is, they must be held not to be defamatory if a non-defamatory sense
could be twisted out of them."' 25 Apparently this rule was evolved to discourage
the flood of defamation litigation, 26 much of which was of a very petty
nature. 2 7 It gave the courts almost total discretion in disallowing relief; for
example, in Brook v. Watson28 the words, "He is a false knave, and keepeth
a false debt book," applied to a merchant, were held non-actionable. The
court explained:
For the first words. "He is a false knave," it is clear that an action lieth not.
And for the second part, that "he keepeth a false debt book," it is not actionable, for
it is not any discredit unto him; for it may be his servant keepeth it, or that some29
what [something?] might by oversight be misentered therein.
The important thing to note about all these technical rule of defamation is
the extraordinary maturity of the law by the beginning of the seventeenth
century. 0 New categories of slander per se could not be created easily because
those already established were of relatively ancient origins.
During this period of the development of the civil law for slander, no notice
was apparently taken of the difference between written and oral defamation. 31
Perhaps because so few libel cases were brought in the civil courts the rules
of what we now call slander were applied to the entire field of defamation. As
to feel the difficulty, for regarding the action imputed to the plaintiff the court said: "[Allthough such working, &c. is not felony, unless the death of a man or beast ensues, or otherwise that the party invoked the devil, yet it touches a man much in his credit, in begetting
infamy and reproach to the party, that his neighbors fear his company." Also cf., Newlyn v.
Fasset, Yelverton 154, 80 Eng. Rep. 103 (K.B., 1610).
"Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 7 at 355.
- Ibid., at 353.
Ibid., at 353, note 1, quoting March, Actions for Slaunder, 2-3 (1647): "and it were
to be wished... that the greatest part of them were suppressed, that words only of brangle
heat and choler might not be so much as mentioned in those high and honourable courts
of justice. For I profess for my part that I judge of them as a great dishonour to the law,
and the professors thereof; especially when I consider that they are used only as instruments to promote the malices and vent the spleen of private jars and discontents among
men."
Cro. Eliz. 403, 78 Eng. Rep. 647 (Q.B., 1595).
"0Compare note 24 supra.
Ibid., at 403, 648.
Consult argument of counsel in Tanfield and Hiron's Case, Godbolt 405, 406, 78 Eng.
Rep. 239 (K.B., 1624). Some cases during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries involving
written defamation but described by the reporter in a headnote as "slander" are: Cutler v.
Dixon, 4 Co. Rep. 14b, 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B., 1585); Buckley v. Wood, 4 Co. Rep. 14b,
76 Eng. Rep. 888 (K.B., 1591) ; King v. Banks, 2 Keble 22, 84 Eng. Rep. 14 (K.B., 1666) ;
King v. Buck, 2 Keble 138, 84 Eng. Rep. 87 (K.B., 1666); Corbin v. Mercin, 2 Keble 267,
84 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B., 1669) ; the Lake v. King sequence, 2 Keble 361, 462, 496, 659, 801,
832, 84 Eng. Rep. 226, 290, 312, 415, 506, 526 (K.B., 1668-1671). As late as 1802 one English
court refers to "written slander." Maitland v. Goldney, 2 East 426, 436, 102 Eng. Rep. 431,
435 (K.B., 1802). Consult Veeder, op. cit. supra note 7 at 458; Carr, op. cit. supra note 7
at 394.
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late as 1656 a compiler of the then existing English common and statute laws
wrote: "It matters not how the words (if they be actionable) be published or
divulged, whether by writing or speech; for the Action is maintenable in both
Cases.... It is all one, as to the maintenance of the action, if the words be
spoken or written to the person slandered before his face, or of him behind
his back."' 32 Corbin v. Mercin33 is typical of the early libel cases. The court
used rules of slander without mentioning the fact that the defamation was
written, indicating that the civil courts were at this time totally unaware of
the modern oral-written distinction.
In the field of criminal law, however, a distinction grew between libel and
slander. It was first developed in the Star Chamber, probably as a consequence
of that court's control of the press.3 4 In 1606, in The Case De Libellis
Famosis,35 the criminal law of libel and its rationale was said to be:
Every libel is made either against a private man, or against a magistrate or public
person. If it be against a private man it deserves a severe punishment, for although
the libel be made against one, yet it incites all those of the same family, kindred, or
society to revenge, and so tends per consequens to quarrels and breach of the peace,
and may be the cause of shedding of blood, and of great inconvenience: if it be
against a magistrate, or other public person, it is a greater offence; for it concerns
not only the breach of the peace, but also the scandal of government. 36
A libel was defined to include writing, such as "an epigram, rhime, or other
writing

. . .

composed or published to the scandal or contumely of another"

or pictures or signs which could be libellous though containing no written
37
words.
Under this theory for punishing criminal libel, the Star Chamber enforced
its laws 38 upholding indictments where there admittedly could be no civil
action in the case. In Barrow v. Lewellin39 a bill was brought by Barrow
"against Maurice Lewellin, for writing unto him a dispiteful and reproachful
letter, which.. . was sealed and delivered to his own hands, and never otherwise published." The court said:
[T]hough the plaintiff in this case could not have an action of the case, because
it was not published, and therefore could not be to his defamation, without his own
fault of divulging it... yet the Star Chamber for the King doth take knowledge of
such cases and punish them, whereof the reason is, that such quarrellous letters tend
' William Sheppard, An Epitome of all the Common and Statute Laws of this Nation,
c.3 "Of an Action of the Case in general," points 5-6, at 21 (London, 1656).
'

2 Keble 267, 84 Eng. Rep. 166 (K.B., 1669).

' Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 7 at 336; Carr, op. cit. supra note 7 at 392-93; Veeder,
op. cit. supra note 7 at 463-64.
' S Co. Rep. 125a, 77 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B., 1606).
Ibid., at 125a.
- Ibid., at 125b.

I Consult, 2 Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, 304-6 (1883).
'Hobart
S
62, 80 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B., 1616).
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to the breach of the peace, and to the stirring of challenges and quarrels, and there40
fore the means of such evils, as well as the end, are to be prevented.
With the passing of the Star Chamber into history (1640), the king's courts
took on the responsibility of protecting the peace by punishing libel. In Rex v.
Beare,41 the defendant was indicted because he industriously collected many
false and scandalous libels. The court said, "That the transcribing and collecting this libellous matter was highly criminal without publishing it, and that it
was of dangerous consequence to the Government." In the course of the
opinion it was said:
Turton and Rokeby Justices cited some cases, to prove, that the writing of a libel,
without publishing, was punishable in the Star Chamber, and by consequence now
42
punishable by indictment.
Slander in the criminal law was distinguished from libel because it was not
considered as dangerous to the public welfare. This distinction was clearly
accepted in 1704 in the case of Regina v. Langley,43 where "saying to the
Mayor of Salisbury . . . You are a rogue and a rascal" was held to be not
indictable. The court said:
[I]t is true, if these words had been written as they were spoken of the mayor,
an indictment would have laid, for litera scripta manet; and there are many cases
which prove, that the same words, when written, are actionable [indictable], which
44
are not so when spoken.
In the middle of the seventeenth century, English courts were, as seen
above, still treating slander and libel cases alike in civil actions. It was probably a carryover from the criminal law dichotomy that brought on the first
mention of a difference between slander and libel in a civil action. 45 The case
"°Accord: Hicks's case, Hobart 215, 80 Eng. Rep. 362 (K.B., 1619). The defendant had
written to the plaintiff: "You will not play the Jew nor the hypocrite, and in that sort
taunting him for an almshouse, and certain good works that he had done, all which he
charged him to do for vain-glory." The court in the Star Chamber held: "[A]n action of
the case will not lie . . .for want of publication, but the King and Commonwealth are
interested in it, because it is a provocation to a challenge, and breach of the peace."
'Holt, K.B. 422, 90 Eng. Rep. 1132 (K.B., 1699). Also reported in 1 Ld. Raym. 414, 91
Eng. Rep. 1175; Carthew 407, 90 Eng. Rep. 836.
421 Ld. Raym. 418, 91 Eng. Rep. 1177. Cf. King v. Summers and Summers, 1 Lev. 139,
83 Eng. Rep. 337 (K.B., 1676).
'3 Salk. 190, 91 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B., 1704). Also reported in 2 Salk. 697, 91 Eng. Rep.
590; 2 Ld. Raym. 1029, 92 Eng. Rep. 184. See Rex v. Executors of Summers, 1 Keble 931,

83 Eng. Rep. 1327 (K.B., 1677) ; Rex v. Burford, 1 Vent. 16, 86 Eng. Rep. 12 (K.B., 1681) ;
Rex. v. Freake, Comb. 13, 90 Eng. Rep. 314 (K.B., 1687) (the last two cases both holding
slanderous words not indictable).
" 3 Salk. 190, 91 Eng. Rep. 769. The bracketed material is the reporter's correction.
'This carryover is illustrated in 2 Nelson, An Abridgement of the Common Law 1121,
title "Libels" (1726). Nineteen cases are collected under the title "Libels." Though Lake
v. King, number 10, and King v. Lake, number 13, (both of these cases are discussed in
the text at page 141) are the only civil cases involved, they are in no way separated or
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involved had its beginnings sometime around 1679 when one King presented
a petition to the House of Commons concerning the habits and reputation of a
Mr. Lake. This set off a series of defamation cases between the two gentlemen one of the effects of which is still felt today. In the first case, King v.
Lake46 Chief Baron Hale, for the first time, utilized the libel-slander distinction in a civil case. Lake had written in answer to King's petition to the Commons that "the prosecutor is Mr. King, whose violence both formerly and
lately is very notorious, to say nothing before His Majesty's happy restoration,
of which might be said too horrid to be related.., and that the plaintiff's petition is stuffed with illegal assertions, ineptitudes, imperfections, clogged with
gross ignorances, absurdeties, and soloecisms." The court recognized that had
this been verbal, and not written, it would not have been actionable. Without
proof of special damages the allegations would not have fit within any of the
categories of actionable slander. Nevertheless, the court decided in favor of the
plaintiff:
[A]lthough such general words spoken once, without writing or publishing them,
contains
would not be actionable; yet here they being writ and published, which
47
more malice, than if they had but been once spoken, they are actionable.
This was an important step in the development of the law. What Hale had
done was to change the form of the cause of action, so that written defamation
was for the first time to be handled like trespass-allowing recovery without
proof of actual damage. Under this theory, only spoken defamation was to
remain akin to negligence, demanding proof of damage for recovery. It is, of
course, impossible to know why Hale did this; perhaps liberalizing the rigid
technicalities of the existing defamation action resulted from his desire to
allow relief for the plaintiff in this one particular case. Judging by the brevity
of Hale's statement, it is even possible that Hale was unaware of the importance of what he was doing.
Apparently the distinction was new to the legal profession, for nowhere in
the arguments of counsel is there any reference to a difference between libel
and slander. Quite the contrary was true; in an effort to prove the actionability
of the alleged words, plaintiff cited two cases of slander. 48 To this, counsel for
defendant "insisted that the words, as recited, were too general to ground an
action upon."
distinguished from the rest of the cases on criminal libel. Also consult Holt's Reports 422-26,
title "Libels" (1738) (though criminal and civil cases are listed together, the first case
reported states a difference between civil and criminal actions: Cropp v. Tilney, discussed
in the text at page 142).
,8 Hard. 470, 145 Eng. Rep. 552 (Ex., 1679).
"Ibid., at 470, 553.
'Higges v. Austen, Yelverton 152, 80 Eng. Rep. 102 (K.B., 1610); Sydenham v. Mav.
Hobart 180, 80 Eng. Rep. 327 (K.B., 1616).
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Nevertheless, the distinction does not seem to have surprised the courts. In
the long series of cases between Lake and King revolving about the petitions
each had presented to Parliament, 49 the case of King v. Lake was mentioned
three times: not once was any doubt or surprise expressed regarding the
result.50 It would be a mistake, however, to say that the libel-slander distinction was immediately integrated into the English law. In 1683, King and Lake,
the same two parties, again found themselves in court. King, an attorney,
brought an action against Lake, alleging:
The defendant, falso & malitiose wrote a letter to ...

the plaintiff's client, con-

taining that the plaintiff would give vexatious, and ill counsel, and stir up a suit, and
that he would milk her purse and fill his own large pockets, &c.per quod he lost the
[client] and other clients.51
At no point in the opinion is the first King v. Lake case cited. Rather, the
court decided in favor of the plaintiff on grounds equally applicable to a
slander case. It was decided that, " 'tis a scandalous letter concerning his profession, and here is special damage: he does give bad counsel; spoken of a
lawyer, judged actionable. ' 52 Vaughan, Chief Justice, dissented. He used the
rule of taking the words in mitiore sensu, saying: "He will milk your purse,
taken enunciatively, signifies no more than milking a bull; the phrase is not
come to an idiom ...

dunce, corrupt, &c. concern the profession; but these

words are applicable to any."53 From the references to special damages and
to the plaintiff's profession, it is apparent that the libel-slander distinction
was at this time in its infancy, at best. Liability was determined as for any
routine slander case; there was no reason even to refer to the new libel
doctrine.
Nine years later the libel-slander distinction was referred to again, this
this time by Chief Justice Holt in Cropp v. Tilney." "[T]he plaintiff declared,
that he stood to be elected for a member of parliament, and that the defendant
caused a libel to be printed of him with certain reflecting words... by which
he lost his election." Holt held:
Scandalous matter is not necessary to make a libel; 'tis enough if the defendant
induces an ill opinion to be had of the plaintiff, or make him contemptible and
ridiculous. 55
" Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131, 85 Eng. Rep. 137; 2 Keble 361, 462, 84 Eng. Rep. 226, 290
(K.B., 1670); 1 Lev. 240, 83 Eng. Rep. 387 (K.B., 1680); 1 Mod. 58, 86 Eng. Rep. 729
(K.B., 1680) ; 2 Keble 496, 84 Eng. Rep. 312 (K.B., 1681) ; 2 Keble 659, 664, 84 Eng. Rep.
415, 417 (K.B., 1682) ; 2 Keble 801, 832, 84 Eng. Rep. 506, 526 (K.B., 1683).
' 2 Keble 462-63, 84 Eng. Rep. 290-91 (K.B., 1679); 2 Keble 801, 832, 84 Eng. Rep. 506,
526 (K.B., 1683).
" King v. Lake, 2 Vent. 28, 86 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B., 1683).
Ibid.
-Ibid., at 29, 290.
5
Holt, K.B. 422, 90 Eng. Rep. 1132 (K.B., 1694). Also reported in 3 Salk. 225, 91 Eng.
'
Rep. 791.
Ibid.
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This attitude was directly opposed to Holt's application of the older rules
guiding slander actions. For example, in Turner v. Ogden slanderous words
alleging theft were "held not actionable; for though imprisonment be the
punishment in those cases, yet per Holt, C. J., [ilt is not a scandalous punishment." 6 Two years later in another case 57 Holt was more explicit about the
existence of this distinction. The action was brought "for dispersing a paper,
accusing a gentleman of saying, 'He could see no probability of the war's ending with France, until the little gentleman on the other side the water was
restored to his right,' innuendo55 'the Prince of Wales.'" Holt said:
A man may justify in an action upon the case for words, or for a libel .... The

innuendo will not make an action upon the case for a libel good, if the matter precedent is not certain, or importing scandal, &c.to the damage of the party. If a man
is in treaty with a woman to marry, and another tells him she is under a precontract,
this does not import a scandal; but yet if it is false, an action will lie. In case upon
a libel, it is sufficient if the matter is reflecting; as to paint a man playing at cudgels
with his wife. 59
The first case after King v. Lake employing the libel-slander distinction as
the basis for the decision was Austin v. Culpepper.0 The defendant had forged
and published an order of the Court of Chancery which stated that the plaintiff should stand committed unless cause be shown; the defendant also drew a
picture of a pillory, writing underneath, "For Sir John and his suborned, forsworn witnesses." According to one of the two reports of the case,(" King v.
Lake was cited by plaintiff as a case where "although none of these words
printed would have borne an action if spoken, yet the action was held to lie."
This report says the court held:
2 Salk. 696, 91 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B., 1705). Compare this statement with that by Coke,
C.J., in Crofts v. Brown, 3 Bulst. 167, 81 Eng. Rep. 141 (K.B., 1617) (an action for slander):
"We will not give more favour unto actions upon the case for words, than of necessity we
ought to do, where the words are not apparently scandalous, these actions being now too
frequent, but they were not so in former times."
"Anonymous, 11 Mod. 99, 88 Eng. Rep. 921 (K.B., 1707).
'The rules regarding the use of the innuendo were very strict: "[P]artly by reason of
the growing elaboration of the rules of pleading, and partly by reason of the desire of the
judges to discourage these actions.... If words were obviously defamatory of the plaintiff,
no innuendo was needed; and if they were obviously not defamatory, an innuendo could
not make them actionable. An innuendo, therefore, could only be of use where the statement
was apparently defamatory, but where the person or thing alluded to in it was not described
with sufficient clearness. It could not add to the statement any additional fact needed to
remedy an uncertainty in the person defamed, or in the charge made against that person.
It could only indicate with greater clearness a person already mentioned, or a charge already made." Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 7 at 368, citing and then quoting James v.
Rutlech, 4 Co. Rep. 17b, 76 Eng. Rep. 900 (K.B., 1599).
' 11 Mod. 99, 88 Eng. Rep. 921-22 (K.B., 1707).
' 2 Show. K.B. 313, 89 Eng. Rep. 960; Skin. 123, 90 Eng. Rep. 57 (K.B., 1695).
"2 Show. K.B. 313-14, 89 Eng. Rep. 960 (K.B., 1695).
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[Aln action lies for scandalizing a man by writing those words, which will not,
62
being spoken, bear an action.
The second report of the case has the defendant arguing that "if the words
will not bear an action, the representation will not." 63 The court held, however,
that an action did lie. The defendant's argument was disposed of, apparently
by the court, as follows: "And 'twas said, that to say of any body that he is a
dishonest man is not actionable, but to publish so, or put it up upon posts, is
actionable." This statement has been understood as referring to the division
between libel and slander. 64 Had the rules of actionability for slander been
applied here, the plaintiff may well have had no case. However, recovery was
allowed when the court distinguished libel from slander.
The law of libel first developed where there was no recovery available within
the limitations of the law of slander. Through a sequence of two cases in the
seventy-five years following Austin v. Culpepper, libel was expanded to be
applied even in those cases where there may have been recovery under the
older law. The new action was coming into its own, instead of merely covering
that to which the law of slander did not apply. The first of these two cases was
Harranv. Delaney.65 The defendant had written defamatory statements regarding the ability of the plaintiff, a gunsmith. 66 The court allowed redress to
the plaintiff, mainly on the ground that this was an allegation directly against
the plaintiff in his trade-one of the old slander per se categories. The two
reports of the case differ slightly in the emphasis given to the fact that this was
a case of libel and not oral words. According to one, the fact that the words
were written served only to aggravate that which was actionable anyway as
slander:
[T]hey [defendant] ought not to say he [plaintiff] is no artist, which they plainly
do . . .the law has always been very tender of the reputation of tradesmen, and
therefore words spoken of them in the way of their trade will bear an action, that
it will
will not be actionable in the case of another person: and if bare words are so,
67
be stronger in the case of a libel in a publick newspaper, which is so diffusive.
According to the other report, the libel-slander distinction was placed as an
alternative ground for the decision. After discussing the libel in terms of the
old slander per se notions, the court concluded:
Skin. 123-24, 90 Eng. Rep. 57-8 (K.B., 1695).
0 Ibid.
6 Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 7 at 365; Carr, op. cit. supra note 7 at 395-96.
' Reported in 2 Str. 898, 93 Eng. Rep. 925 (K.B., 1732) and in Fitzg. 121, 253, 94 Eng.
Rep. 681, 743.

'The defendant had published the following: "Whereas there was an account..

. of

(the

plaintiff) making guns of two feet six inches to exceed any made by others of a foot longer,
... this is to advise all gentlemen to be cautious, the said gunsmith not daring to engage
with any artist in town, nor ever did make such an experiment, (except out of a leather
gun) as any gentleman may be satisfied of at the Cross Guns in Longacre." Ibid.
- 2 Str. 898, 99, 93 Eng. Rep. 925, 926 (K.B., 1732).
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[Wiords concerning a man's trade, are actionable, tho' otherwise importing no
scandal.... And likewise that words publish'd in writing will be actionable, tho' not
so when barely spoken. 68
This case was followed thirty-seven years later in 1769, by Villers v. Monsley.0 9 The defendant had written and published a libellous poem:
Old Villers, so strong of brimstone you smell,
As if not long since you had got out of hell;
But this damnable smell I no longer can bear,
Therefore I desire you would come no more here,
You old stinking, old nasty, old itchy old toad,
If you come any more, you shall pay for your board,
You'll therefore take this as a warning from me,
And never more enter the doors, while they belong to J.P.
The defendant claimed that this was not an actionable libel: "that the itch is
a distemper to which every family is liable; to have it is no crime, nor does it
bring any disgrace upon a man, for it may be innocently caught or taken by
infection. . . . It is not like saying [or?] writing that a man has got the
leprosy, or is a leper, for which an action upon the case will lie, because a leper
shall be removed from the society of men." The court had the choice of following the old slander rules and deciding on the basis of "imputing a loathsome
disease," 70° or the court could refer to the libel-slander distinction as a basis
for liability. Both views were apparently presented. Lord Wilmot, C.J., decided for the plaintiff on the basis of this having been the imputation of a
loathsome disease:
Nobody will eat, drink, or have any intercourse with a person who has the itch
71
and stinks of brimstone; therefore, I think this libel actionable.
Clive concurred in a fifteen word statement. Then came the first opinions
where liability was predicated on the distinction between libel and slander,
even though there might have been liability under the old rules of slander.
Bathurst said:
- Fitzg. 253, 254, 94 Eng. Rep. 743, 744.
0'2 Wils. K.B. 403, 95 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B., 1769). Consult Holt, The Law of Libel 225-6
(Bleecker, Amer. rpd., 1818). Referring to Bradley v. Methuen, 2 Ford's MS. 78, Holt
wrote: "In an action for a libel, Lord Hardwicke made two questions, 1st, Whether the
words, which it is not necessary here to repeat, were actionable if spoken? 2d, Whether
actionable when written? As to the latter question, he said, there is no necessity to touch
on it; but undoubtedly courts do make a distinction between words written and bare
words. His lordship puts actions and indictments for libels precisely on the same footing."
Judging from the sequence of cases discussed by Holt, and the fact that Lord Hardwicke
died in 1764, this case was most probably decided some time after 1732 and certainly before
1769. The reporter could not be found.
" The "itch" is defined as "a contagious disease, in which the skin is covered with
vesicles and pustules, accompanied by extreme irritation." 5 Oxford English Dictionary
520 (1933). As seen in the quotations, the justices disagreed on the question of whether
this malady fit within the catagory of loathsome diseases and was therefore slander per se.
' 2 Wils. K.B. 404, 95 Eng. Rep. 887.
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I have no doubt at present but that the writing and publishing any thing which
renders a man ridiculous is actionable.
However, there must have been some doubt, for he continued a couple of lines
later:
I repeat it, that I wish there were some more solemn determination, that the
writing and publishing any thing which tends to make a man ridiculous or infamous
ought to be punished.
Then, after stating his doubt, he continued by distinguishing the same case
if it were a case of "saying" instead of writing:
for saying a man has the itch, without more, perhaps an action would not lie with72
out other malevolent circumstances.
Gould was even more confident. In his words:
[T]here is a distinction between libels and words; a libel is punishable both criminally and by action, when speaking the words would not be punishable in either
way; for speaking the words rogue and rascal of any one, an action will not lie; but
if those words were written and published of any one, I doubt not an action would
lie. If one man should say of another that he has the itch, without more, an action
would not lie; but if he should write those words of another, and publish them
maliciously, 7 3 as in the present case, I have no doubt at all but the action well lies.
The Villers case was interpreted during the next thirty years as having determined, once and for all, that the rules for libel were different from those for
slander. In a 1791 edition of Blackstone, 4 there is a footnote quoting the part
of the Gould opinion differentiating libel from slander. Villers v. Monsley
is cited, as well as King v. Lake and Austin v. Culpepper. The footnote continues: "The same distinction was taken and allowed in a late case in the exchequer chamber, by a writ of error brought there, Easter term, 29 Geo. III."
Blackstone himself made no comment on the libel-slander division; and this
was noted in a 1794 edition:
When this was originally written by the learned Commentator, the important distinction between libels and words spoken does not seem to have been so fully established as it was some time afterwards by the case of Villers v. Mousley, [sic] viz. that
whatever renders a man ridiculous, or lowers him in the esteem agd opinion of the
world, amounts to a libel; though the same expressions, if spoken, would not have
been defamation....
" Ibid. Bathurst apparently is referring to the need of proof of special damages.
' Holdsworth, op. cit. supra note 7, at 371-75, gives a history of the need fo, proving
malice in a defamation action. Originally, malice was alleged as a form, meaning at most
publication without just cause. "But, when it became customary to allege malice both in
declarations in civil cases and indictments in criminal cases, it naturally came to be thought
that malice was an essential ingredient both of the tort and crime." Ibid., at 371-72. During
the nineteenth century, however, malice came to be accepted as implied in law, and the
necessity of proving malice was eliminated.
"'3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 126, note a (11th ed., Burn, 1791).

1955]

COMMENTS

A young lady of quality lately recovered 4000 1. damages for reflections upon her
chastity published in a newspaper; yet she could have brought no action for the
grossest aspersions which could have been uttered against her honor.75
In 1787 and 1795 two cases more firmly imbedded the libel-slander distinction in our law. In the first 76 the defendant had printed in a newspaper an
article "meaning to insinuate and be understood thereby that the said plaintiff
was illegally, fraudulently, and dishonestly concerned and connected with
divers swindlers and common informers, and shared with them the spoil and
plunder by them from other persons unlawfully, fraudulently, dishonestly, and
by swindling, gotten and obtained." The argument revolved about the sufficiency of the complaint. At one point towards the close of his argument, the
plaintiff said, "And even though certain words, which scandalize the character
of another, be not actionable in themselves, yet if they be reduced to writing,
they become the subject of a libel." 7 7 The court, not discussing this point,
held:
"If the plaintiff had been a common swindler, the defendant ought to have in78
dicted him; but he has no right to libel him in this way."
The second case was a slander action for substantially the same words. The
defendant had said, "You are a swindler." The defendant, arguing against
actionability for these words, said:
The word swindler has no definite meaning.... It is indeed libellous if written and
published, J'Anson v. Stuart.. . . But many words are libellous if written that are
not actionable if spoken, such for instance as those which tend to make a man ridiculous, or to cause him to be avoided in society as having a noisome disease, Villers
V. Mo7sley.79
The court must have accepted this method of distinguishing the J'Anson case;
for though this point was not mentioned explicitly, the court said: "If the
word swindler be not actionable, [the defense counsel] has established his
point." The decision was for the defendant. So the word "swindler" was
found to be actionable if written, but not if spoken.
By 1798 the libel-slander distinction was so fully accepted that a defense
counsel refused to argue against it. In Bell v. Stones0 the plaintiff had been
called a "villain," and "there were other counts on words spoken in derogation
of the Plaintiff's professional character, and of his ability to pay his debts."
' 3 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 125, note 6 (12th ed., Christian,
1794). Also consult 4 Jacob, Law Dictionary 139 (American ed., 1811): "The important
distinction between libels and words spoken was fully established in the case of Villars v.
Mousley [sic]." In 2 Kent, Commentaries on American Law 16 (1827),

the libel-slander

distinction is stated and Villers v. Monsley is cited. There is no reference to Thorley v.
Kerry, discussed in the text at pages 132 and 150.
11J'Anson v. Stuart, 1 T.R. 748, 99 Eng. Rep. 1357 (K.B., 1787).

7Ibid., at 752, 1359.

" Ibid.

Savile v. Jardine, 2 H. Bl. 531, 532, 126 Eng. Rep. 686, 687 (C.P., 1795).
1 Bos. & P. 331, 126 Eng. Rep. 933 (C.P., 1798).
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At the trial it was held that "the letter on which the first count proceeded,
unsupported by proof of special damage, was not actionable." This was reversed, "the [appellate] Court expressing themselves clearly of opinion that
any words written and published, throwing contumely on the party, were actionable, Le Blanc [the defense counsel] declin[ing to] argu[e] the point." 8'
In the first few years.of the nineteenth century the question of a libelslander distinction was placed before several American courts. In each case,
statements were made regarding the general understanding of the English law.
The first American case was presented to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
in 1803. The defendants had published a newspaper charging the plaintiff, a
clergyman,
[W]ith having got a cudgelling in Virginia from an inhabitant, whom he persuaded
that it was not right to sleep every night with his wife; that she lay alone, and
Runkle [plaintiff] took the opportunity and came into her room; that the wife gave
her husband a sign, and he apprehended him in his roguery and beat him his skin
full.82

A reference was made to the name of the real author at whose instance the
libel was printed. The defendants claimed "they were only responsible in cases
where they withheld the real authors, against whom the suit should be brought.
Libelling was a species of slander, and all slander should be measured by the
same rule." Denying this statement by the defense, the court charged the jury:
Slanderous words and libels are not measured by the same rules in courts of justice.
The offence of a libel is more heinous, as its circulation of the slander is more extensive, and derives too an additional degree of malignity, from its being done premeditatedly. [Citations.] Its excuse rests not on the common infirmity of mankind.
It is the mark of a depraved and wicked heart. Any written or printed words which
render a man ridiculous, or throw contumely on him, are actionable.-But it is
otherwise of words spoken; and this distinction has been long settled. [Citing the
8
Villers, Harman,and Bell cases discussed above.]

-Ibid., at 332, 934. Sometime after Bell v. Stone, supra, and before Thorley v. Kerry,
infra note 87 (1812), the following comment was written: "There is a distinction between
a libel and words. To write and publish maliciously any thing of another, which either
makes him ridiculous or holds him out as a dishonest man, is held to be actionable ...
criminally, when the speaking of the same words would not be so. For writing is a more
deliberate act, and contains more malice than bare speaking. Therefore, speaking the words
rogue and rascal, cheat and swindler, or to say of another that has the itch, are held not
to be actionable; but the writing of these words maliciously is held to be so. [Citing some
of the cases discussed in the text supra, from King v. Lake through Harman v. Delaney.]
The same distinction has been adhered to ever since.... Bell v. Stone." Note at 1 Saund.
248, 85 Eng. Rep. 291 (6th ed., 1846). Because Thorley v. Kerry is referred to only in a
note to this footnote, this footnote must have originally been written before 1812, most
probably for an earlier edition of the reporter.
SRunkle v. Meyer, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 518 (1803).
Ibid. The jury brought back a verdict for the plaintiff. In 1812 two similar statements
were made by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court regarding the libel-slander distinction. The
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In 1809, the words "he is a lying, slanderous rascal" were the cause of a
libel action before the United States Circuit Court of the District of Columbia.
In answer to a demurrer, the plaintiff, citing the Villers and Bell cases, said:
"Words written and published are actionable, which would not be if spoken
only. Any words written and published, throwing contumely on the party, are
actionable." According to the reporter, "The Court rendered judgment on the
8 4
demurrer for the plaintiff.1
In 1812 the Supreme Court of New York also accepted the libel-slander distinction as well grounded in precedent.85 The defendant had printed references
regarding the plaintiff "import[ing] that he swore with levity, and rashly, and
inconsiderately, without due regard to the solemnity of the oath, or to the
truth and accuracy of what he said." In a per curiam decision in favor of the
plaintiff, the court said:
[T]he words are actionable, for a writing published maliciously, with a view to
expose a person to contempt and ridicule, is undoubtedly actionable; and what was
said to this effect by the judges of the C.B. in Villers v. Mensley [sic] is founded in
law, justice, and sound policy.8 6
first was dictum in M'Clurg v. Ross, 5 Binn. (Pa.) 218 (1812), an action for slander.
Plaintiff had been accused of absconding with funds of the "United Irishmen." Chief Justice
Tilghman, discussing the common law involved, said: "There is a great difference between
words spoken and words written. It is actionable to charge a man in writing, with anything
which may degrade him in the estimation of society. But many things may be spoken
which afford no cause of action, although they contain charges of wicked and disgraceful
conduct. This distinction is not without reason. Words are often spoken in heat, in haste,
and with very little reflection or ill attention, and frequently forgotten or repented of as
soon as spoken. But writing requires deliberation, and is therefore more injurious to the
character attacked." M'Clurg v. Ross, supra, at 219. The second discussion in 1812 of the
distinction between libel and slander was in M'Corkle v. Binns, S Binn. (Pa.) 339 (1812).
The action was for two libels printed by the defendant. In the first, the plaintiff was termed
a "public pest." The second, paraphrasing part of the first libel, charged that the plaintiff
"has been deprived of his full standing, and in partaking in communion [with the church],
because of his groundless and infamous assertions." Following a verdict for the plaintiff, a
motion in arrest of judgment was made, on the ground "that the publications in question
were not libellous." The court denied this statement. Tilghman, C. J., said: "The distinction
between slander by words, and by printing or writing, is so well known, that it is unnecessary to dwell on it. Suffice it to say, that any malicious printed slander, which tends
to expose a man to ridicule, contempt, hatred or degradation of character, is a libel." Justice
Yeates concurred, saying: "Any publication which tends to bring a man into disrepute,
ridicule or contempt, is a libel in a legal sense. The distinction between words written or
printed aild published and the same words spoken, is clearly settled. Litera scripta tnanet.'
M'Corkle . Binns, supra, at 341, 342, 348, 352.
'I Cranch (D.C.) 569 (1809).
* Steele v. Southwick, 9 Johns. (N.Y.) 214 (1812).
hIbid., at 215. A year later the same New York court reiterated the rule, "There is, however, a distinction between oral and written or printed slander, which is noticed in all the
books; and the latter is deemed much more pernicious, and will not so easily admit of
justification." Doyle v. Lyon, 10 Johns. (N.Y.) 447, 449 (1813).
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The only apparent dissent from the existence of the distinction in the years
immediately preceding the Thorley case is found in a reporter's note to an
1809 English case: "but the Court wait for the decision of the case of Kaye v.
Bailey, depending in the Exchequer Chamber; in which the question is,
whether an action will lie for words in writing which would not be actionable
if merely spoken? "s
Thorley v. Kerry, the case discussed in the beginning, came up three years
later. The libel was in a letter:
I sincerely pity the man (meaning the Plaintiff ... ), that can so far forget what
is due, not only to himself, but to others, who, under the cloak of religious and spiritual
reform, hypocritically, and with the grossest impurity, deals out his malice, uncharitableness, and falsehoods.88
In basing his defense on the ground that there was no distinction between
written and oral defamation the defendant could not have had a more sympathetic court. Mansfield was something of a reactionary, who would have liked
nothing better than to apply the old technical rules of slander to the new libel
action. However, Mansfield felt forced to hold "that [the] distinction between
slander and libel has been established by some of the greatest names known
to the law" 9 and that it was too late to reverse the trend.
The cases discussed show that Mansfield's interpretation of the precedents
was correct. His only choice was to overrule the prior cases or to dissent from
the opinion of the court. Perhaps a greater judge would have chosen the
former path. Mansfield chose the latter, and in this strange opinion dissented
vigorously from his own decision. Ironically, by overruling his own able dissent, he made it virtually impossible for any later court to find grounds for
rebuilding the law of defamation into a logical system.
I Following Earl of Leicester v. Walter, 2 Camp. 251, 255, 170 Eng. Rep. 1146, 1147
(C.P., 1809). Campbell later wrote: "The important question concerning written slander
referred to in Earl of Leicester v. Walter ... has at last been decided in the Exchequer
Chamber; and it is now settled that an action may be maintained for defamatory words
reduced into writing, which would not have been actionable if merely spoken.
"The case of Kaye v. Bailey, which I mentioned before, was allowed to drop, on account
of the death of the defendant; but the same question immediately after arose in the case of
Thorley v. Earl of Kerry in error. 3 Camp. 214, 170 Eng. Rep. 1358-59 (1812).
8 4 Taunt. 355, 128 Eng. Rep. 367 (C.P., 1812) ; also reported in 3 Camp. 214, 170 Eng.
Rep. 1358.

'Ibid., at 364-66, 371. Mansfield here named, "Lord Hardwicke, Hale, I believe, Holt
C. J., and others," with a special reference to Hardwicke in the following senence. The
cases involved presumably are: Bradley v. Methuen, per Lord Hardwicke, discussed supra
note 69; King v. Lake, per Chief Baron Hale, discussed in text at page 141; Cropp v. Tilney,
and Anonymous, both per Chief Justice Holt, discussed in text at pages 142 and 135.

